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I. General remarks
The previous proposal for a company law directive on takeovers in 1990
1 was rejected in
Germany almost unanimously for several different reasons.
2 The new "slimmed down" draft
proposal, in the light of the subsidiarity principle, takes the different approaches to investor-
protection in the various member states better into account. Notably, the most controversial
principle of the previous draft, viz. the mandatory bid rule as the only means of investor-
protection in case of a change of control, has been given up. Therefore a much higher degree
of acceptance seems likely. The Bundesrat
3 (upper house) and the industry associations
4 have
already expressed their consent; the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) will deal with the proposal
shortly. The technique of a "frame directive" leaves ample leeway for the member states. That
will shift the discussion back to the national level and there will lead to the question as to how
to make use of this leeway (cf. II, III, below) rather than to a debate about principles as in the
past. It seems likely that criticism will confine itself to more technical questions (cf. IV, below).
II. Public takeover bids
The current draft deals - as did its antecedents - with two different issues which will be treated
separately in the following: the regulation of public takeover bids and the protection of outside
shareholders in case of a change of control over a company.
1. The current regulation
Public takeover bids do not currently play a practical rôle in Germany.
5 There is no explicit
statutory regulation of public takeovers. The Ministry of Finance's Stock Exchange Experts
Commission has however developed rules concerning public takeover bids. The previous2
"Guiding Principles" of 1979 consisted of few non-binding recommendations. In July 1995 the
Commission published a new, comparatively comprehensive takeover code.
6 It will be
implemented through contractual recognition by potential offerers, target companies and
companies engaged in share dealing. So far it has been recognized by 229 of the 674 listed
companies (numbers as of end of April, 1996).
2. Adaptation or replacement of the current regulation?
The question is whether, and with what corrections this new voluntary takeover code could
continue to exist, or whether it would have to be replaced completely should the EU proposal
become binding. The following remarks will be confined to two main problems and not deal
with every point where an adaptation or change of the current regulation seems necessary.
a) According to arts. 1, 11 of the EU proposal, the member states will not have to implement
the rules of the directive by statute or administrative acts. Other regulations or prodecures of
implementation will be admitted provided that these will ensure compliance with the rules of
the directive (art. 11). The technique of voluntary contractual recognition adopted by the
German Takeover Code does however, not meet this requirement.
7 Even if all domestic listed
companies and financial advisors signed the Code, it would not encompass all potential
bidders, and in particular not foreign bidders. There are no enforceable sanctions against those
who have not signed the Code for not complying with it. Compliance with the Code could thus
not be ensured.
8 That means that at least the current technique of implementation through
contractual recognition would have to be replaced by normative (statutory) rules.
b) Similar considerations apply to the supervisory organ which has to be put in place according
to art. 4 of the proposal. Art. 4 admits that associations or private institutions may serve as
supervisory organs. The German Takeover Code provides that a "Takeover Commission" will
ensure compliance with the Code. The powers of this commission rest however, on the
contract signed by the parties thereto and are hence clearly limited. Powers in respect of third
parties would require a statutory provision.
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Both points (a] and b] supra) make it likely that a statutory regulation would have to substitute
the new Takeover Code.
10 The (opposition) Social Democrats have anticipated that and tabled
a bill last year which contained, inter alia, a takeover regulation.
11
III. Change of control and shareholder protection
The most controversial provision in the previous drafts was the mandatory bid rule as the only
means of shareholder protection in case of a change of control. Due to the fierce resistance of
some member states, namely Germany and The Netherlands, other equivalent measures may
now be taken (art. 3).
1. Limited focus of art. 3
The current proposal still does not fit well, at least in respect of the German approach in cases
of a change of control in a public limited company. A mandatory bid rule will protect the
interests of the present shareholders only. It does not take care of the interests of the future
shareholders of a dependent company, including those of the present shareholders who are not,
for whatever reason, willing  to accept the tender offer. Nor are the interests of the creditors
and employees of the company addressed. Art. 3 picks out only one out of a whole raft of
questions connected with changes of control and then requires an assessment of whether the
existing national regulation is equivalent to a mandatory bid. The following remarks will hence,
following this narrow focus of art. 3, be confined to the question of how the present
shareholders are currently protected in case of a change of control.
2. The statutory regulation
The traditional approach of German statute law so far has been the ex-post protection of
outside shareholders, in particular by specific provisions in the law on groups of companies
(§§ 317 ff. Stock Corporation Act). German company law provides for an obligatory takeover
of all outstanding shares only in case of specific inter-company agreements (§§ 305, 320 b
Stock Corporation Act).4
The question whether this statutory ex-post protection is at least equivalent to the ex-ante
protection provided by a mandatory bid rule is not easy to answer. On the one hand, it is
claimed that the ex-post protection provided for by §§ 311 ff. Stock Corporation Code is not a
very effective one.
12 On the other hand, if the ex-ante protection afforded by a mandatory bid
rule were not combined with ex-post shareholder protection rules, it is hard to assess what
regime outside shareholders would prefer, given that art. 10 of the EU proposal will also allow
partial mandatory bids. Outside shareholders would definitely most welcome a combination of
both approaches. That is exactly what the new German Takeover Code tries to achieve (cf. 3,
below), but it seems clear that art. 3 of the proposal does not require such a combination.
3. The new Takeover Code
The new Takeover Code
13 provides for a mandatory takeover bid (art. 16 of the Code).
Although the details of the regulation of the Code in this respect are hardly convincing
14 one
has always to keep in mind that the regulations of the Code supplement the statutory
shareholder protection rules in cases of a change of control.
15 Together with these they
certainly meet the standard of art. 3 of the EU proposal,
16 even though they might not be
convincing in every detail. But an enactment in national law of an EU-takeover directive would
give rise to further discussion and perhaps to an improvement of the provisions of the
Takeover Code.
17
IV. Amendments to the proposal
a) The German industry associations have proposed in their comment that the wording of art. 3
be more specific. A takeover directive should in their opinion make it clear that indirect
holdings do not constitute "control" of a company. Further exemptions should be made for
various cases in which continuous control is not intended. In my opinion such a specification
does not seem necessary. It is perfectly sufficient that the proposal (art. 2 sec. 2) leaves it to
the member states to define in which cases "control" will be found.
b) The rule in art. 3 sec. 2 should be reconsidered. According to German private international
law, for instance, the consequences of a change of control for the outside shareholders5
(mandatory bid? other remedies and protective rules?) depend to the law applicable to the
target company itself.
18 According to art. 3 sec. 2 however, the question of whether "control"
has been acquired would have to be judged separately, according to the law applicable where
the supervisory organ is located.
19
c) The wording of art. 8 a) seems too narrow. The shareholders' consent may be difficult to
obtain because of the comparatively short offer period.
20 The directive should instead rely on
the liability of directors, should they intentionally and without justification thwart the
possibility of tendering the shares.
d) If in the case of a partial bid, more shares are offered than the bidder is asking for (cf. art. 10
sec. 2), the quota for the offering shareholders should be derived from the total of all offered
shares rather than from the total of all shares in the company.
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